The Relativism at the Basis of European Policy*
by Janne Haaland-Matlary
(University of Oslo)

The trend towards nihilism, a hundred years after Friedrich Nietzsche wrote “Beyond good an evil” [5] , aptly sub-titled “Precursor to a philosophy for the future”, is manifested in the lack of belief in human ability, through reasoned debate and thinking, to arrive at objective truth about human nature and human virtue and vice. This stance is pronounced and implicit in European politics today. The very concept of truth itself is not only contested; as it has always been, but seen as fundamentalist and repressive; as something undemocratic.
This strange aversion to the concept of truth is intimately linked to the concept of ‘political correctness’ (PC). It is perhaps the most powerful concept we have in our modern Western democracies, and is a wholly immaterial one. The power of being PC or not has been felt by most people: one senses that something which used to be ‘comme it faut’, suddenly is not. The media no doubt play a key role in this process of ‘shaming’ and ‘praising’. To think that one can discover objectively valid moral truths is certainly the most ‘un-PC’ position possible. It is however the position argued for in this book.
This subjective, media-driven power of the PC is only possible because there is no search for truth, as that is assumed away as impossible and probably as basically undesirable. But with such a premise, human rights can never exist, for they cannot be defined. The paradox of modern European democracy is exactly this: we profess and impose human rights all over the globe, but refuse to define the substance of these rights at home. We hold that they mean what we choose them to mean at any one time; thereby making PC the guiding star of politics. The majority of voters do not speak out in referenda on these issues, but so-called ‘public opinion’ is moulded in media-driven campaigns, often in clever alliances with single-interest groups. Part of this ‘norm entrepreneurship’ is to ‘shame’ and intimidate minority views and to create an appearance of majority opinion through clever uses of the media. Thus, in this way the ‘tolerance’ claimed becomes deeply intolerant.
The end result is that might becomes right, the logical implication of extreme subjectivism.
Can the Grundwerte be defined? Can there be an objective discussion about ethics? I now turn to the analysis of professor Ratzinger in this regard.

1. A Rationality that embraces Ethics?
The current paradigm of rationality is based on the idea that rationality (Vernuft) is independent of both creator and human being. This is, underlines Raztinger, entirely true when we speak about natural science: «Sie beruhen auf einer Selbsbegrenzung der Vernuft, die im technischen Bereich erfolgreich und angemessen ist, aber in der Verallgemeinerung der Menschen amputiert» [6] . The consequence of only accepting this limited form of rationality is that the human being no longer has any idea of how to reason about right and wrong, and that he has no standard of ethics outside of himself: «Sie haben zur Folge, dass der Mensch keine moralische Instanz ausserhalb seiner Berechnungen mehr kennt» [7] . This implies that all that is not within the confines of empirical science – all that which relates to political and personal norms and values – are seen as wholly subjectivistic.
Why is this a problem? The difference between a pluralist society and a relativist one lies in the existence of some common norms, Grundrechte in German. Citizens are expected to agree on some things, usually thought about as a ‘social contract’ by political philosophers. For instance, stealing is wrong and must be punished; stable families are good for the upbringing of future citizens and hence, good for society; etc. But modern relativism denies any common norms beyond those of political correctness. Indeeed, this paradigm leads to a limitless concept of freedom since there are no standards or limits outside subjective judgement: «der Freiheitsbegriff scheint grenzenlos zu wachsen» [8]. Modern European man has cut off his historical roots and regards history and its philosophical insights as invalid for him. The real progress in natural science has led to the misunderstanding that a similar progress has taken place in human ‘science’. Not only is modern man totally ignorant of his own philosophical and theological history, but he believes – tragically – that technical and economic progress implies civilisational progress. Also, the state of technical knowledge dictates what one in fact does with and for the human being, because «was man kann, das darf man auch – ein vom Konnens abgetrenntes Durfen gibt es nicht mehr» [9]. “Durfen” – the should – the normative question of ethics – is now regarded as something to be resolved by the power of public opinion and personal preference.
Is functional rationality enough for the human being and for politics? The answer is no. Is this rationality self-sufficient? No, when it is used to decide in non-technical matters, i.e. normative ones.
How can rationality be defined beyond the sphere of technical scientific argument? Can there be a rational determination of basic norms and values? This latter question would seem to be a folly today, even if human rights as a concept are based on the postulate of a human nature that is the cause of human rights: we have human rights because we have human dignity, as each and every preamble to human rights conventions reads. Further, the Nurnberg trials were premised on the existence of a higher moral law that in fact was argued to be common to all human beings and knowable for all human beings. If we accept this on purely pragmatic grounds – i.e. the human rights edifice is based on this postulate – we immediately must ask about this form of rationality – does it exist, how does it work?

2. Politics is the sphere of the rational
It is very interesting, but not surprising, that professor Ratzinger as Pope Benedict XVII has chosen to write large parts of his first encyclical about rationality. In the second part of Deus caritas est [10] he discusses how rational decisions in political life can be restored. Reason needs constants correction, he states, because «it can never be free of the danger of a certain ethical blindness caused by the dazzling effect of power and special interests»[11] . Reason is inborn in man, but can be and is often corrupted. This is the ancient Aristotelian position where virtue and vice are in constant contestation. The Church stands firmly in this tradition of natural law, which is not specifically Christian at all. The only role for the Church in political life, says the Pope, is therefore to argue «on the basis of reason and natural law», «to help purify reason and to contribute to the acknowledgement and attainment of what is just» [12] .It is because the Church is ‘an expert in humanity’ that she has something to contribute in this respect; and the Church «has to play her part through rational argument» [13]. The aim is to reawaken a sense of justice in people, which is the essence of rational argument about politics. Justice is one of the four cardinal virtues and the one proper to politics in the writings of classical political philosophy. The Pope distinguishes very sharply between the role of religion and that of politics, stating that «the formation of just structures is not the direct duty of the Church, but belongs to the sphere of politics, the sphere of the autonomous use of reason» [14] .The Church should concern herself with souls, and with promoting the truth about human nature – its virtues and vices, its ability for improvement; in short, its spiritual life. But politics is something else, an autonomous sphere which is neither religious nor private, but which has its own ‘mandate’ and rationality. The Pope defines politics as the ‘sphere of the autonomous use of reason’ – not as that of interests or power, but as the sphere of reason.
How can this be? What does this mean?
In his speech to the Benedictine monastery in Subiaco, on receipt of the Premio San Benedetto in April 2005 – some days before he was elected Pope; he underlined that Christianity is the «religion of the Logos» [15]. Logos is the Greek word for reason, in Latin ratio. To be rational is, surprisingly enough, equivalent to being human: the definition in the classical Aristotelian and Platonic philosophic tradition is that the human being is a «rational and social animal». As discussed in previous chapters, rationality is the ability to offer arguments and justifications for something; unlike animals, which also have language and can communicate with each other; the human being is the only entity that can reason about things. Thus, animals fight, make love, procreate, hunt, eat, play and live a communal existence by instinct, but only humans can reason about all these natural activities.
Morever, ratio defines the human being itself; without reasoning he simply would not be a human being. The ability to reason is inborn in very human being, but it can be destroyed – such as in illess or handicap, and it can be corrupted, such as in people who refuse to discern right from wrong. Having the ability to reason is not equivalent to using that ability.
Ratio enables man to reason about fact as well as value: one can discern truth and falsehood in a factual statement, such as “the house is red”. Unless on is colour-blind, one is able to tell whether this is a true statement or not if one knows the word for ‘red’ and ‘house’. But the same logical ability is present in ethical or moral judgments: an uncorrupted human being can arrive at the conclusion that is it wrong to steal or to kill. The criticism by David Hume much later simply misses the point, because the Aristotelian definition of the human being and his rationality entails ethical ability: Reasoning about ethics is as natural and inborn, and as rational, as is reasoning about empirically observable facts. Animals will most probably steal each others’ prey if they have the chance, whereas humans may do the same and indeed often do, but they nonetheless know that this is wrong. At least they do not believe that it is right.
The modern European rationality is therefore only a partial rationality, as it extends only to technical, mathematical, or empirical knowledge. The entire classical tradition of humanism has been forgotten and suppressed over centuries of skepticism and criticism ala Hume’s. One may object that this tradition has thereby been rendered obsolete by most modern standards, and that it cannot be revived and made usable to the modern, secular human being.

3. Reviving Natural Law
To this must first be said that the natural law tradition is by no means religiously founded. It is an entirely secular tradition that postulates one premise, viz. that there is a knowable and constant human nature, and that knowledge is arrived at through rational discernment. The Pope, when he was still cardinal, made the point to me in conversations that natural law has to be re-made in modern language; its premises are valid, but one cannot revive a tradition that has been side-lined for so many centuries as it was. While natural science and the natural based on that has progressed; natural law has not really this into account. Moreover, the critical issue is that of the ‘human sciences’, which seem to have regressed rather than progress .

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