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From Norms to Normative Behaviors

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Abstract: **From Norms to Normative Behaviors**
Social scientists often draw on "norms" to *causally* explain human behaviors, which behaviors are therefore referred to as "*norm*ative". The author first proposes a provisional notion of "normative behavior" (as distinct from "economic behavior") and briefly mentions the problems raised by the notions of "norm" commonly used. Then, he proposes a conceptualization of "norm" as disposition to experience a superegoic emotion with regard to a behavior and examines various types of norms and normative behaviors. Finally, he points to some issues that require further investigation.

Keywords: Norm, Normative Behavior, Psychoanalysis, Reactive and Proactive Aggression, Primary Socialization.

1. Introduction

Social scientists often avail themselves of the theoretical entity they call "norm" to explain and predict certain behaviors that, according to them, are caused by norms and are therefore referred to as "*norm*ative behaviors".

For example, a social scientist may hypothesize that John,

* This article re-examines in a hopefully improved way some issues that I have already discussed in: "Reducing Norms to Superegoic Emotions", in *Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics*, 23, 2021, 2, pp. 283-307; *Norma. Una concettualizzazione per la sociologia del diritto e le altre scienze sociali*, LED, Milan, 2022; and *Norms, Rights, Obligations: An Attempt at Empirical Reduction*, forthcoming. It also raises a few new issues. I wish to thank Paolo Di Lucia, Claudio Luzzati, and Sergei Talanker for their unvaluable suggestions. All errors are my own.

(1) after the decease of Mary and

(2) unbeknownst to anybody—including Mary's daughter—,

(3) makes to Mary's daughter a favor that he believes would have been asked for by Mary, because

(4) he subscribes to the *norm* according to which favors should be reciprocated and

(5) Mary had made a favor to him in the past.

In this example, (1) and (2) are necessary to rule out the hypothesis that John performs (3) out of an economic, or selfish, motivation. If no other selfish motivation can be hypothesized, (3) can be explained as the combined effect of (4), that is, the existence within John's psyche of a theoretical entity called "norm" and (5), that is, Mary's having acted in the past in a way that elicited that norm within John's psyche.

In such a case we can hypothesize that John takes a *normative behavior*.

At this stage, by "normative behavior" I provisionally understand *a behavior*[1] *that is taken by an actor because they believe that it is conformable to a norm* (α) *to which they adhere and* (β) *of which they regard themselves as an addressee.*[2] In other words, a normative behavior is a behavior that involves the *compliance with a norm*, understood as *intentional conformity* with it.

But, what are we to understand by "norm"? All the definitions I am aware of have one or more of these flaws:

(α) They use undefined terms such as "should", "must", or "obligation";

(β) They do not cover all behaviors usually regarded as normative;

(γ) They cannot be used to distinguish between normative and economic behaviors.[3]

To overcome these problems, in the next Section and Subsections I present a stipulative definition of "norm" as (psychical) disposition to experience a superegoic emotion (e.g., anger, indignation, disgust, guilt, shame, pride) with

[1] The term "behavior" is used here as a hypernym for "action" (in a strict sense) and "abstention from action".

[2] An actor's motivation may be impacted, or affected, by a norm also in ways *other than* by pushing them to comply with it. See P. Di Lucia, "Agire *secondo* una norma, agire *per* una norma, agire *in funzione di* una norma," in P. Comanducci & R. Guastini (eds.), *Struttura e dinamica dei sistemi giuridici*, Giappichelli, Turin, 1996.

[3] Examples of (α), (β), and (γ), can be found, respectively, in Vincenzo Ferrari's, Niklas Luhmann's, and Theodor Geiger's definitions. See E. Fittipaldi, *Norma*… , cit.

regard to a behavior (*qua* object of perception or representation[4]). In the conclusion, I address some issues raised by this approach.

2. Types of norms and normative behaviors

The notion of "norm" as disposition to experience a superegoic emotion with regard to some behavior object of perception or representation presupposes the notion of "superegoic, or normative, emotion".

By "superegoic emotion" I refer to the emotions that emerge or get reshaped by virtue of the fact that human animals during their childhood conceive of their caregiver with the features that monotheisms ascribe to the One God. Since I have dealt with this issue in detail elsewhere[5], here I confine myself to what is strictly necessary to arrive at the notion of "normative behavior".

Key to the conceptualization of "norm" proposed here is the notion of "superegoic emotion". This notion is premised on the following hypotheses:

> (1) During their childhood, human animals (as well as some other animals that will not be discussed here) depend on their caregivers for their survival.
>
> (2) As long as their dependence lasts, children experience *respect* toward their caregivers.
>
> (3) Following Bovet[6] and Piaget[7], I understand 'respect' as a *blend of love and fear*—a fear that includes first and foremost the dread of losing one's caregiver's love and being abandoned by him.[8]
>
> (4) Along with experiencing respect, the way children conceive of their caregivers closely resembles the way monotheisms conceive of the One God[9], that is, as an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and eternal being.
>
> (5) Some of the features children use to ascribe to their caregivers keep characterizing (or leave "mnestic traces" to) the emotions that they learn to experience or get reshaped by virtue of (1), (2), (3), and (4)—*and those emotions only*; hence their "authoritativeness".

[4] Due to space limitations, I cannot deal with this issue here.
[5] E. Fittipaldi, *Norma*… , cit., and "Reducing… ", cit.
[6] P. Bovet, "Le respect: essai de psychologie morale", *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, 1917, 5, 2, 204-222; and *Le sentiment religieux et la psychologie de l'enfant* (1925), English translation *The Child's Religion*, Dent & Sons, London & Toronto (ON), 1928, p. 47.
[7] J. Piaget, *Le jugement moral chez l'enfant* (1932), English translation *The Moral Judgement of the Child*, The Free Press, Glencoe (IL), 1948, p. 321.
[8] Throughout, I refer to the caregiver as he and the child as she.
[9] *Ibi*, p. 380.

(6) Point (5) makes it possible to group superegoic emotions as a coherent subset within the larger set of emotions.

Since (4) is shared also by Freud[10], I refer to these emotions as *superegoic emotions*. I understand "superegoic" as synonymous with "normative", but I prefer the former term as the latter may convey the wrong impression that the definition of "norm" provided here is circular. Further, even though I do not accept the hypothesis that by virtue of primary socialization a *reified agency* referred to as "superego" emerges within socialized human animals, contrary to Piaget[11], I adopt the hypothesis that *primary socialization* is sufficient for the emergence of full-blown normative emotions and that (normative) *secondary socialization* is only possible due to transference mechanisms.[12] Further, the hypothesis is adopted that normative emotions always involve forms of unconscious re-experience of some aspects of the child–caregiver interactions. This is why the approach adopted here can be regarded as psychoanalytical.

In the next subsections, I discuss some superegoic emotions, along with the norms they can constitute and the normative behaviors they can cause. Due to space limitations, only some of those emotions can be discussed.

2.1. Anger, anger-constituted norms, and the normative behaviors they can cause

Anger is here reconstructed as *socialized*[13] *reactive aggression*. As for *reactive aggression*, it is understood as "a response to a *threat* or *frustrating event*, with the goal being only to remove the provoking stimulus"[14]. If reactive aggression is innate, by virtue of the interaction with her caregiver the child learns to experience it only in certain cases, such as physical attacks or breaches of promises.[15]

[10] E.g., S. Freud, *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* (1932), English translation *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, in Idem (J. Strachey ed.), *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* and *Other Works*, The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psychoanalysis, London, 1981, p. 163.
[11] J. Piaget, *Le jugement*… , cit., p. 62.
[12] I understand "transference" broadly, as the process by which an individual displaces on some new figure emotions, ideas, etc., that he or she used to ascribe to some previous significant figures in her or his life (cf. C. Rycroft, *A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis*, 2nd ed. Penguin Books, London,1995, p. 185).
[13] From now on, unless otherwise specified, by "socialization" I refer only to primary socialization.
[14] R. Wrangham, "Two types of aggression in human evolution", in *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 2017/2018, available at https://www.pnas.org/content/115/2/245 (accessed November 12th, 2021), italics added.
[15] A completely naturalized conception of promises is expounded in E. Fittipaldi, "On Searle's Derivation and Its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist's Perspective", in P. Di Lucia & E. Fittipaldi (eds.), *Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021.

More in detail, due to a process of:

(1) *typification* of the cases in which the child believes that her caregiver would *tolerate* or even *encourage* her reactive aggression and a process of

(2) *cognitive refocusing* from the cases that would elicit her reactive aggression (e.g., breaking a promise) to those that would prevent that reactive aggression from being elicited (e.g., keeping the promise)

most children learn, not only to conceive certain behaviors as *wrongs*—for which only (1) is needed—, but also to experience a *sense of right*, or *entitlement*, to the *non-occurrence of corresponding anger elicitors*.

Unlike *unsocialized* reactive aggression, due to the child–caregiver interaction, anger always involves the unconscious re-experience of one's caregiver tolerance or encouragement, and so even in cases where, as a consequence of secondary socialization and the transference mechanisms it involves, this emotion gets redirected towards behaviors that can be completely unrelated to those that the caregiver used to accept as potential elicitors of reactive aggression.

Anger—along with other emotions that cannot be discussed here, namely, resignation and vicarious anger[16]—can also be referred to as a "jural" emotion. "Jural" is used here as the adjective of "right" and *jural emotions*, along with *moral emotions*, are considered to make up the whole of normative emotions[17]. As will be seen shortly, moral emotions can be understood as *non-jural* emotions, since they do not involve the experience of having been *wronged* or the *frustration of a full-blown sense of right*.

Based on this proposal, a jural norm can be conceptualized as follows:

$(b_{Ego}) \rightarrow (\text{ANGER}_{Alter})(b_{Ego})$

This formula can be read as follows: the taking of behavior *b* on the part of Ego elicits anger in Alter at the taking of behavior *b* on the part of Ego.[18]

The existence of this norm within Alter's psyche[19] can cause a variety of normative behaviors on the part of him.

If b_{Ego} amounts to Ego's *non-tolerance* of (α) an action or (β) an abstention on the part of Alter (for example, [α'] his expressing his opinion on some sensitive topic or [β'] his non-attending mass on Sundays), normative behaviors are Alter's

[16] See E. Fittipaldi, *Norma...* , cit., and *Norms...* , cit.
[17] More details can be found in E. Fittipaldi, "Reducing...", cit.; *Norma...* , cit., and *Norms...* , cit.
[18] To be precise: Alter's *belief* of the taking of behavior *b* on the part of Ego elicits anger in Alter at the presumed taking of behavior *b* on the part of Ego. In other words, what causes emotions are not *facts*, but *beliefs in facts*—whether correct or not. This qualification holds also with regard to the other normative emotions and will not be repeated.
[19] This type of norm can exist only within Alter's psyche. Throughout, I refer to Ego as she and to Alter and Tertius as he.

taking a certain action or abstaining from a certain action due to his being "backed" by his potential anger (i.e., due to his being unconsciously encouraged by his possibly-since-a-long-time-deceased caregiver), should he fear that Ego might *disapprove* of that action or abstention. In these cases, (socialized) reactive aggression helps Alter take a behavior that a pure economic motivation might alone not be capable of causing and which might therefore remain a fantasy (psychoanalytically understood). It is of paramount importance to stress that anger may lead to take anti-economic actions, in that, people "blinded by anger" often take behaviors that are incompatible with their well-pondered interests.[20] However, when it comes to distinguishing between normative and economic behaviors, what matters is not whether a given behavior is actually beneficial to the individual who takes it but rather whether superegoic emotions are involved in its causation.

We are dealing with a second type of normative behavior on the part of Alter in the event Ego's *non-tolerance* of Alter's action or abstention does not consists of a mere disapproval but of actual *attempts to prevent Alter from taking a certain action or force him to take it*. In such cases, Alter's anger may cause him:

(1) to express his anger at Ego's attempt—whether successful or not;

(2) to violently overcome Ego's attempt and take that action or abstain from it, or

(3) to violently react against Ego's successful attempt to prevent him from taking that action or abstaining from it.[21]

If, instead, b_{Ego} amounts to some action or abstention from action on the part of Ego herself (rather than to her tolerance of Alter's behavior), all the following behaviors on the part of Alter can be regarded as normative:

(1) his expressing anger at Ego's action or abstention from it;

(2) his taking violent behaviors aimed at forcing Ego to abstain from that action or to perform it, and

(3) his reacting violently behaviors against Ego due to her having taken that action or abstained from it (revenge or punishment).

It is of paramount importance to stress that if *Ego does not recognize*

[20] But, what are in the final analysis one's own interests? To what extent are they independent of pride, as discussed below? Due to space limitations, I cannot discuss this issue here.
[21] Legal theorists will not fail to notice that I belong to the minority that accepts the notion of "right to one's own behavior" ("*Recht auf eigenes Verhalten*").

(α) Alter's right to take a certain behavior or

(β) Alter's right that Ego take a certain behavior

but, this notwithstanding,

(α') she abstains from disapproving of or interfering with it, or, respectively,

(β') she takes it

merely due to her fear of Alter's reaction, according to the conceptualization proposed here, hers is an economic and not a normative behavior. (Due to space limitations, I cannot discuss the emotion to which the acknowledgment of another's right amounts to; which emotion may cause Ego, rather than Alter, to take normative behaviors.[22])

2.2. Indignation, indignation-constituted norms, and the normative behaviors they can cause

If here *anger* is understood as socialized reactive aggression, *indignation* is understood as socialized proactive aggression. Unlike other animals, human proactive aggression appears to be capable of being unrelated to any goal at all,[23] as happens in the case of torture performed for its own sake.[24] This is why, until a more precise characterization of proactive aggression among human animals is offered by empirical sciences, here it is simply defined as an emotion pushing to act aggressively *in the absence of any threat or frustration*.

The way proactive aggression undergoes socialization is *to some extent* similar to that of reactive aggression. By virtue of the interaction with her caregiver, the child learns[25] to experience proactive aggression only in certain cases. For indignation to emerge from unsocialized proactive aggression the elicitors of this latter must be *typified* into *wrongs*, which are, by definition, non-jural (i.e., moral), that is, *victimless wrongs*; where their moral nature amounts to the absence of a

[22] See E. Fittipaldi, "Reducing… ", cit.; *Norma… ,* cit.; and *Norms… ,* cit.
[23] Among non-human animals, such goals may be predation or the protection or conquest of new territory.
[24] R. Wrangham, *The Goodness Paradox: The Strange Relationship between Virtue and Violence*, Pantheon Books, New York, 2019, p. 29.
[25] If a society without socialized reactive aggression is hardly imaginable, I believe that one without socialized proactive aggression (as well as without all other moral emotions) is. Due to space limitations, I cannot discuss this issue here.

right-holder.[26] [27] If reactive aggression, when socialized, is capable of being redirected toward a wide variety of behaviors (a robber can experience as an anger-eliciting frustration their victim having no money to give them), the socialization of proactive aggression—due to its gratuitousness (in *homo sapiens*)—may, perhaps, lead to an even wider variety of elicitors, ranging from begging on the street to dressing immodestly.[28] Once typified into wrongs, indignation elicitors may involve a *cognitive refocusing* that leads to the *expectation* of their non-occurrence.

However, it should be pointed out that, since—

(1) unlike reactive aggression—proactive aggression can be hypothesized to be a *pleasant emotion* and

(2) the tabooization of in-group aggression, except for very specific cases, appears to be a human universal,

indignant people search for *pretexts* to exert their violence and those pretexts are often reframed as *(moral) wrongs*, by pretending that begging, dressing immodestly, having sex outside the wedlock, etc., are threats to society, something disliked by God, etc.

Indignation-backed norms can be formalized as follows:

$(b_{Ego}) \rightarrow (\text{INDIGNATION}_{Tertius})(b_{Ego})$.

That is, the taking of behavior *b* on the part of Ego elicits indignation in Tertius at the taking of the behavior *b* on the part of Ego. As can be seen, no Alter is involved. Nor is any right-holder. This is why I regard indignation as a *moral* emotion which can be located exclusively within bystanders (Tertii).

The existence of such a norm within the psyche of Tertius may cause three types of normative behavior on his part:

(1) it may cause Tertius to express his disapproval of Ego's behavior;

(2) it may cause Tertius to try to force Ego to not take *b*—for example, to dress modestly;

[26] By elaborating on Wrangham's (*The Goodness...* , cit.), it could be conjectured that indignation is typically elicited against behaviors disliked by male coalitions.

[27] The absence of right-holders is the consequence of the fact that nobody is experienced or experiences themselves as entitled to the non-occurrence of indignation elicitors.

[28] It should be observed that, if proactive aggression is directed towards conditions or states of affairs, it gives rise to disvalues (e.g., impropriety) or values (e.g., modesty). To some extent, this holds for all normative emotions, which for this reason should, perhaps, be referred to as normo-evaluative emotions.

(3) it may cause Tertius to exert violence against Ego for taking or having taken *b*—for example, stoning Ego to death for having committed adultery.

In order to have an indignation-backed (moral) normative behavior rather than an anger-backed (jural) one it is necessary that Tertius (who should be otherwise referred to as Alter) do not act aggressively because (i) he experiences himself as the victim of Alter's behavior or (ii) sympathizes with Alter (as in this latter case we would be dealing with a jural emotion, which I have elsewhere referred to as "vicarious anger"[29]). My hypothesis is that in such cases the violent behavior is taken out of *reactive* aggression and has nothing in common with proactive aggression.

Also in this case, it is of paramount importance to stress that, if Ego abstains from taking behavior *b* merely due to his fear of Tertius's indignation, Ego's is not a normative but rather an economic behavior.

2.3. Disgust, disgust-constituted norms, and the normative behaviors they can cause

Paul Rozin and April E. Fanlon, by elaborating on some ideas of the Hungarian-American psychoanalyst Andras Angyal[30], define disgust as the "[r]evulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an offensive object"[31]. A problem with this definition is that *the term "revulsion" already involves the idea of disgust,* and so we are not dealing with a well-formed definition. To clarify this point, think of the prospect of eating a *metal bolt*. Such a prospect does indeed scare most, or even all people, but hardly produces the kind of revulsion that is typically involved by the prospect, say, of eating the *worm-ridden decaying corpse of a non-human animal*. This is why *I would define disgust as a form of nausea caused by the perception or representation of something*.[32]

Much as anger and indignation have non-socialized forerunners (reactive and proactive aggression), also disgust appears to have its non-socialized forerunner, namely, the less-than-three-year-old children's tendency to spit out bitter things[33]; which can be referred to as *proto-disgust* (just as reactive and proactive aggression could also be referred to as proto-anger and proto-indignation).

Due to socialization, the child may learn to experience disgust also towards foods *other than* bitter ones and then, possibly, even towards behaviors *other than*

[29] See E. Fittipaldi, *Norms…* , cit.
[30] A. Angyal, "Disgust and related aversions", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1941, 36, pp. 393-412.
[31] P. Rozin & April E. Fanlon, "A Perspective on Disgust", 1987, 94, 1, pp. 23-41, here p. 23.
[32] On the relation between disgust and urge to vomit, see R. Herz, *That's Disgusting: Unraveling the Mysteries of Repulsion*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York & London, 2013.
[33] *Ibi*, p. 46.

eating or drinking, such as conditions and states of affairs. As a result, disgust-backed norms emerge, which can be formalized as follows:

$(b_{Ego}) \rightarrow (\text{DISGUST}_{Tertius})(b_{Ego})$,

that is, the taking of behavior *b* on the part of Ego elicits disgust in Tertius at the taking of behavior of *b* on the part of Ego. Formally, disgust acts much in the same way as indignation. Not even in this case is any Alter, or right-holder involved. This is why also disgust-backed norms must be characterized as *moral* (i.e., non-jural normative) emotions.

Much as indignation, the existence of such a norm within the psyche of Tertius may cause three types of normative behavior on his part:

(1) it may cause Tertius to express his disapproval of Ego's behavior;

(2) it may cause Tertius to try to force Ego to not take *b*—for example, to prevent Ego from entering a temple due to her having touched a corpse and not having subsequently performed a purification ritual.

(3) it may cause Tertius to exert certain violence against Ego for taking or having taken *b*—for example, expelling from the community Ego due to her having entered a temple after touching a corpse and without previously performing a purification ritual.[34]

Not even in this case, can we speak of normative behavior with regard to Ego if she abstains from behavior *b* merely due to her fear of Tertius's disgust-backed behavior. (Instead, Ego's behavior would be normative if it is caused by her urge to avoid shame. Cf. below, Section 2.5)

2.4 Guilt, guilt-constituted norms, and the normative behaviors they can cause

From the psychoanalytical perspective adopted here, guilt emerges when the child believes—whether correctly or not—that she caused her caregiver some form of pain or distress. This means that the emergence of guilt presupposes the innate ability of the child to make empathetic hypotheses concerning the presence of certain emotions in others—whether or not in a sympathetic manner.[35]

[34] This example is freely adapted from Numbers 11-13.

[35] By "empathy" I understand the ability to make hypotheses concerning others' emotions *without* necessarily experiencing anything similar to them, whereas by "sympathy" I understand empathy *along with* the ability to have such experiences. Due to space limitations, I cannot discuss the question whether empathy presupposes one's having previously experienced the hypothesized emotions. On this issue, cf. L. Passerini Glazel, "Leon Petrażycki's Reconstruction of Normative

However, as long as empathy is not socialized, it can be regarded at the most as a form of proto-guilt. It goes without saying that also proto-guilt may impact behavior, as the hypotheses Self can make concerning Other's[36] emotions can (economically) impact her motivation and then her behavior, as long as those hypotheses can help her predict his reactions to a possible behavior of hers.

In order for full-blown guilt to emerge (as distinct from proto-guilt), we must recall that the child loves and fears her "godlike" caregiver and is also terrified at the *prospect* of losing the love of a person on whom she depends entirely (see, above, Section 2). If, by empathizing with him, she starts believing that he is experiencing some pain or distress because of something (she believes) she did, she may become terrified at that prospect. Guilt—as distinct from proto-guilt—is here understood as the subsequent *unconscious re-experience* of this terrifying experience during adolescence and adulthood. It is this unconscious re-experience that turns proto-guilt into full-blown normative guilt.

It is also crucial to distinguish between *guilt* and *non-normative regret*. This latter amounts to Self's painful recollection of the *sympathetic* experience of the pain or distress that she (believes she) caused to Other (along with the desire to undo it—a desire, though, that is present also in the case of guilt). Unlike guilt, non-normative regret is a selfish, or economic, behavior because only Self's sympathetic emotions are involved, and so *without any unconscious re-experience of emotions experienced during her interactions with her caregiver*. In other words, while guilt is triadic psychical phenomenon, non-normative regret is a dyadic one, as only in the case of guilt is also the caregiver involved—at least unconsciously.[37]

To further clarify the difference between guilt and mere regret, we can compare a caregiver$_1$ who looks after his child because he loves her and thus tries to avert his own experience of non-normative regret and a caregiver$_2$ who looks after his child in order not to experience guilt, along with its characteristic unconscious re-experience of the dread of losing his own caregiver's love (who, of course, may have passed away a long time earlier).

Prior to formalizing guilt-constituted norms, it should be pointed out that, once proto-guilt has turned into full-blown normative guilt, it can be experienced also toward animate beings *other than* one's caregiver. Here some form of transference is obviously involved.

Based on this conceptualization, a guilt-constituted norm can be conceptualized as follows:

Experiences", in E. Fittipaldi & A. J. Treviño (eds.), *Leon Petrażycki: Law, Emotions, Society*, Routledge, New York & London, 2023.

[36] When I discuss economic interactions or I discuss normative interactions without specifying the roles assumed by each participant in it, I use Self, Other, and Third. I refer to Self as she and to Other and Third as he.

[37] To avoid misunderstanding, it should be stressed that in either case all the participants may exist exclusively within Self's or Ego's psyche.

$(b_{Ego}) \rightarrow (\text{GUILT}_{Ego})(b_{Ego})$

That is, the taking of behavior *b* on the part of Ego elicits (within Ego) guilt at her taking behavior *b*.

We can now ask how guilt-constituted norms can cause normative behaviors.

The way they work is quite different from that of anger, indignation, and disgust. As we have seen, anger, as it were, encourages Alter to pursue his interests (if not necessarily in an effective way), while indignation and disgust provide a motivation for exerting violence, respectively, for the pure sadistic pleasure of being violent and to the mere goal of removing a disgust elicitor that—at a conscious level—has nothing in common with a threat or frustration.[38] Instead, guilt-constituted norms do not provide a motivation for exerting violence (except for such cases as where, for example, it comes to protect a beggar from the aggression of a gang of people who, say, are indignant at her or his begging).

Guilt-constituted norms basically provide a motivation:

(1) for abstaining from harming others (or oneself) and,

(2) if harm has been caused, for (2.1) undoing it (if still possible) or (2.2) proactively asking for forgiveness (if undoing it is impossible).

Thus we can distinguish between two types of normative behavior caused by guilt-constituted norms:

(1) behaviors aimed at averting the experience of guilt; for example, stopping one's car to help a bleeding person lying on the sidewalk, and

(2) behaviors aimed at reducing or removing guilt, if the actor has already taken a guilt-eliciting behavior, for example, making a U-turn to help a bleeding person lying on the sidewalk, if the actor intentionally drove past them without stopping.

In some sense, guilt-constituted norms (as much as shame- and pride-constituted ones; which will be discussed shortly) push people to act in an instrumentally rational way (*zweckrational*)—to use Weber's terminology, in that the goal (*Zweck*) pursued by the actor is averting or reducing guilt. This shows that Weber's notion of *Zweckrationalität* overlaps with value rationality (*Wertrationalität*), and provides no tool for distinguishing between economic and normative behavior.

[38] At an unconscious level, it could be argued that disgust elicitors, in the final analysis, are threats of contamination. However, I do not believe that this justifies treating disgust towards behaviors as forms a reactive aggression. This is not to deny that disgust may cause reactive aggression.

2.5. Shame, shame-constituted norms, and the normative behaviors they can cause

Along with the inhibition of his child's aggressiveness, one of the first things the caregiver tries to teach her is how to deal with her bodily wastes, saliva, bolus, etc. This aspect of primary socialization is often referred to as "toilet training", but this term is too restrictive as it does not cover, for example, the possible tabooization of eructation. Other scholars used such terms as "sphincter morality"[39] or "habituation into pureness [*Reinlichkeitsangewöhnung*]"[40]. However it is referred to, as a result of this form of socialization the child learns to experience what in many languages we refer to as "shame".

Since the elicitors of shame vary dramatically across cultures: from not avenging a murdered kin[41] to making a solecism, I believe that, instead of characterizing shame based on its elicitors, it is better to characterize it based on its origin (whose mnestic traces also in this case are hypothesized to unconsciously perpetuate themselves into adolescence and adulthood).

My hypothesis is that shame amounts to the experience of being disgusting to other people and emerges due to the caregiver's displays of disgust with regard to certain activities or excreta of the child.[42] In other words, the experience of shame may be reconstructed as the unconscious re-experience of the infantile experience of being disgusting to one's "godlike" caregiver. Quite literally—at least in some cultures—, to be ashamed amounts to unconsciously experiencing oneself like the bodily waste "par excellence" (in the eyes of one's God).[43]

The manner in which shame-constituted norms can be formalized is identical with that of guilt-constituted ones.

[39] S. Ferenczi, "Psychoanalysis of sexual habits", in *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 1925, 6, p. 379.

[40] C. Müller-Braunschweig, "Psychoanalytische Gesichtspunkte zur Psychogenese der Moral, insbesondere des moralischen Aktes", in *Imago*, 1922, 7, p. 250.

[41] To avoid misunderstanding, it should be stressed that, depending on the culture considered, the non-vengeance of a murdered kin may give rise to the non-normative phenomenon of the fear of the reaction of that kin's soul, to the fear of the indignation of other group members, to guilt, to shame, etc.

[42] Such displays may occur in a completely unintentional manner. A problem with this reconstruction seems to be that many children interpret disgust faces as expressions of anger (S. C. Widen & J. A. Russell, "The 'Disgust Face' Conveys Anger to Children", in *Emotion*, 2010, 10, 4, pp. 455–466). The hypothesis proposed in text would be falsified if it could be shown that children are capable of developing shame prior to developing the ability of distinguishing between disgust and anger faces. On the role of disgust faces in the socialization of children, see also M. Lewis, *Shame: The Exposed Self*, The Free Press, New York, p. 110.

[43] To be sure, in certain cultures this experience may even be conscious. In some languages (e.g., Italian), to report one's experience of shame, sentences that should be literally translated as "I felt [like] a s**t" are used ("Mi sono sentito una m***a").

(b_{Ego}) → (SHAME$_{Ego}$)(b_{Ego})

Also in the case of shame-constituted norms we can distinguish between two types of normative behavior:

(1) behaviors aimed at averting the experience of shame; for example, abstaining from inviting people at one's place if one believes it is not clean enough to have guests and

(2) behaviors aimed at reducing shame, like saying such lies as that a solecism in a published article was introduced by the typesetter.

As for (2), it should be observed that, due to their different origin, guilt-reducing behaviors are quite different from shame-reducing ones. Guilt-reducing behaviors are aimed at repairing the damage caused to the victim or offering to him or her some form of compensation, while shame-reducing ones are aimed at concealing one's shameful behavior or hiding oneself, and so to the point of committing suicide.[44] This is so because those who experience shame, rather than focus on *what they did*, focus on *what they are*, and regard what they did as a mere index of what they supposedly "truly" are.

A final remark is in order here. It is sometimes argued that shame presupposes one's belief that others are aware of what one has done and therefore shame is not a full-blown moral emotion. Apart from the fact that it has been compellingly argued that shame can be completely private,[45] it should be observed that others' awareness of our behavior can be a shame elicitor only insofar as we already experience a certain behavior as shameful. For example, if Self does not already experience dressing out-of-fashion clothes as shameful, the fact Other may notice or even make remarks about that will not elicit any form of shame in Self.

2.6. Pride, pride-constituted norms, and the normative behaviors they can cause

If guilt and shame can be regarded as internal *negative* sanctions that motivate behaviors aimed at averting or reducing them, pride can be regarded as an internal *positive* sanction that pushes one to take a behavior that makes it possible to experience it.

As noted repeatedly, my approach is premised on the hypothesis that the child conceives of her caregiver in the manner monotheisms conceive of the One God. Consequently, the most exciting experience for a child is to believe to be like her

[44] J. P. Tangney & R. L. Dearing, *Shame and Guilt*, The Guildford Press, London, 2002.
[45] M. Lewis, *Shame*… , cit., pp. 75-76.

"godlike" caregiver or to meet his expectations. Pride can be reconstructed as one's unconscious re-experience of that infantile experience during their adolescence and adulthood.

Just as many other normative emotions, once we learn to experience pride, it can be elicited by the most diverse accomplishments, including ones our caregiver knows nothing about or he would even disapprove of. Due to a transference mechanism, during adolescence the role of "godlike" model usually ceases to be played by one's caregiver and is replaced by one's peers. This is where secondary socialization sets in. By virtue of it, it may occur that the child of a staunch atheist becomes a believer who proudly practices painful penitential practices to be closer to the sufferings undergone by Jesus, or the other way around. The continuity between the infantile pride and the adolescent and adult one is made up solely by the emotional mnestic traces of the infantile pride, and so regardless of its infantile elicitors (but this holds for all normative emotions).

Pride-constituted norms can be formalized as follows:

$(b_{Ego}) \rightarrow (\text{PRIDE}_{Ego})(b_{Ego})$

The taking of behavior *b* on the part of Ego elicits pride within Ego at her taking *b*.

Also pride-constituted norms can be hypothesized to cause two types of behavior:

(1) behaviors aimed at experiencing pride, such as studying hard in order to obtain good grades;

(2) behaviors aimed at stopping pride-preventing states of affairs, such as studying harder to obtain better grades.

It should be observed that often pride-preventing behaviors may amount to shame-eliciting ones (and *vice versa*). This is why pride is sometimes reconstructed as the "opposite" of shame. However, this claim is, perhaps, incompatible with the reconstruction of shame proposed here, according to which shame amounts to the unconscious experience of being *disgusting* to others. A way for making such a claim compatible with my approach could be to understand pride as the unconscious experience of oneself as an "appetizing" being. This is a daring conjecture—to say the least—that requires further investigation.

3. Conclusion and open questions

In this article, I have briefly presented anger-, indignation-, disgust-, guilt-, shame-, and pride-constituted norms. A more detailed discussion can be found

elsewhere,[46] where also contempt, jural resignation, and vicarious anger are discussed. Other normative emotions, such as admiration still require investigation. What this article contains that cannot be found in my previous works and is an attempt to show *which types of normative behavior norms may cause*.

This is only the first stage of a more complex investigation aimed at bridging legal and moral concepts to contemporary psychology. Many issues still need to be clarified. For example, legal theorists:

(1) conceptualize the *addressees* of norms and

(2) distinguish between (α) *primary* and (β) *secondary norms*, that is,

(α) norms pushing to take certain behaviors ^{1}bb, and

(β_i) norms pushing to take different behaviors $^{2}bb_i$ aimed at trying to coerce recalcitrant actors into taking ^{1}bb and
(β_{ii}) norms pushing to take different behaviors $^{2}bb_{ii}$ aimed at exerting violence on those who did not take ^{1}bb without the conscious goal of coercing them into taking ^{1}bb (revenge or punishment).

As for (1), we can identify the addressees of guilt-, shame-, and a pride-constituted norms with the actors within whom such norms are located, while in the case of indignation- and disgust-constituted norms, they can be identified with those whose behaviors elicit indignation and disgust. In the case of anger, we can identify two types of addressees, those who have the disposition to get angered by some people's behavior and those whose behavior has the chance of angering other people. Respectively, they are commonly referred to as right- and duty-holders. As can be seen, such terms as "ought to" or "can" can be used with regard to different participants in a social interaction, whether or not a norm is present within them. Ego can say that she ought to take a certain behavior simply because Alter jurally expects her to act in that way, and so even if Ego has no disposition to experience any superegoic emotion with regard to her behavior. The issue of why the same terms (e.g., "ought to" or "can"—this latter in the case of rights to one's own actions) can be used no matter whether a norm is within the utterer cannot be addressed here and is to some extent an open question.

As for (2), we can distinguish between:

(α) behaviors that prevent the elicitation of *unpleasant* normative emotions (all the normative emotions discussed here except for pride and, perhaps, indignation) and behaviors that cause the elicitation of *pleasant* normative emotions (here, pride and, perhaps, indignation), on the one hand, and

[46] See E. Fittipaldi "Reducing... "; cit., *Norma*... ; cit., and *Norms*... , cit.

(β) behaviors aimed at reducing already elicited *unpleasant* normative emotions as well as behaviors aimed at stopping the non-elicitation of *pleasant* normative emotions, on the other.

A difficult question is whether indignation (and to some extent also anger) really is an *unpleasant* normative emotion. Do not moral sadists experience a sort of pleasure? If this is so, why do they need pretexts? I hinted at a possible explanation, however, due to space limitations this problem can be addressed here.