Persona elettronica. Una finzione giuridica per l’intelligenza artificiale

Abstract: Electronic Person. A Legal Fiction for Artificial Intelligence
In the premise, it is observed that the technological advancement of artificial intelligence is pushing advanced mechatronic systems to transform into sophisticated robotic forms, which now lack an android morphology but emulate typically human faculties and resemble artificial persons.
The introductory part of the study critically explores the foundational aspect of robotic subjectivity and re-examines the epistemological parallels, commonly accepted in the modern era, between the calculating machine and human consciousness: the traditional comparison between the digital device and human reasoning capability; the view of software as agents, carriers of ethical and legal responsibility; the definition of mechanical entities capable of recognising and emulating emotions.
In the next part of the essay, the tendency to superficially humanise machines, through a naive imitation of human behaviour, is criticised, and the theoretical and practical difficulties of establishing an acceptable comparison between artificial intelligence and human consciousness are highlighted, still presupposed on the basis of a reductive conception of human subjectivity.
In the conclusion, the question is raised as to whether and to what extent, based on the epistemological premises outlined in the first part, sophisticated mechatronic systems and advanced robotic entities might attain the qualification of “electronic person”, a legal fiction indicated by the Resolution of the European Parliament of 16 February 2017 and currently overlooked by the recent AI Act of the European Union.