Pourquoi la morale a-t-elle besoin du réalisme?

Abstract: Why does morality need realism?

The article discusses whether moral realism can be reduced to the mere assertion of the existence of moral truths, and what significance moral realism may have for realism in general. It argues that a mere objectivity disconnected from any reference to reality is not sufficient to do justice to morality. At the same time, it discloses morality as a dimension of the relationship to reality in general and thus sees in moral realism not a mere local application of an abstract philosophical realist perspective, but a condition of realism in general, as far as the latter is about our commitment to reality. In this regard, it discusses Markus Gabriel’s ‘New Realism’ as an example of the intrinsic limitation of an approach to moral realism in purely ontological terms. In this discussion, it clarifies the significance of context for moral realism.