NATURAL LAW TRADITION IN HUNGARY
FROM THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES TO 19TH CENTURY
di József Szabadfalvi*
University of Debrecen

Education based on natural law concepts had become more and more anachronistic by the end of the 18th and the early 19th centuries due to the fact that these concepts were opposed to the original ideas of Enlightenment and those of the French Revolution. In the second decade of the 19th century a new concept of philosophy appeared in the Hungarian literature of philosophy. In contrast to the conservative legal theory, Kantian philosophy and legal doctrines came into prominence.

The first work to be mentioned in a chronological order is a summary in Latin by János Sámuel Fuchs (1770–1817) [23] and another work, referred to above, written by János Sz. Szilágyi (?–1854) in 1813, Oskolai tanító könyv a tétető (practica) filosophia második része: Természeti törvény tudomány (Jus naturae) (The second part of a school textbook in practical philosophy: natural law doctrine), which was the first publication to discuss the whole system of the Kantian doctrine in the Hungarian language. [24] Other philosophers such as Zsigmond Carlowszky (1772–1821) [25] and Mihály Greguss (1793–1838) [26] also taught natural law based on the Kantian concept in the Lutheran College of Eperjes (Presov).

The works published in the first third of the 19th century, as is true of the whole period of the national philosophical thinking, basically served the purposes of education in law and partly in philosophy, and were only secondarily aimed at the renewal of scientific considerations in the philosophy of law. From this point of view, the writing by Mihály Szibenliszt (1783–1834) [27] in Latin as a translation of and partly a commentary on a work by Franz Zeiller and Franz Egger, [28] professors in Vienna, cannot be regarded as an original opus. This work replaced the book by Martini and was used as a textbook at the University of Budapest and in the royal academies of law. The main achievement was that it was the first time criticism had been provided on Martini’s natural law doctrine in an official textbook. The purposes of education were also served by a book published in Latin and written by István Bánó (?–1862) based on Zeiller, Egger and Szibenliszt. [29] Antal Albélyi’s (1794–1875) introduction to the philosophy of law [30] and a book by Gyula Gerlóczy (1837–1893) based on a work by Antal Bauer were used for twenty years from the early 1860s together with the textbooks by Tivadar Pauler as compulsory legal literature. [31]

Among the contemporary authors of Kantianism, Imre Csatskó (1804–1874) professor of the academies of law in Kassa (Kosice) and Győr, later judge of the royal court, must be mentioned. In his introduction to natural law – although with strong reference to foreign, mainly German professional literature (Zeiller, Likawetz, Gross and Krug) – he created a coherent theoretical system. His main work in legal philosophy was published in 1839 under the title Bevezetés a természeti jogba és a tiszta általános természeti jog (Introduction to natural law and the pure general natural law). [32] In his work he discusses in detail, among other topics, the sources, classification, ideas and use of natural law, as well as the connection between natural law and related principles, and furthermore provides a review of the bibliography of the professional literature of that time. He is concerned with the „original” human rights and obligations.

Due to the book by Csatskó, the Kantian concept gained ground in Hungarian legal thinking. The elaboration of an official legal concept and also the textbooks used in legal higher education at that time are connected to Antal Virozsil (1792–1868), professor of legal philosophy at the faculty of law in Budapest. Virozsil can be regarded as a renowned philosopher of law in the second third of the 19th century, whose main merit was that he taught philosophy of law in the Kantian attitude at the only university of Hungary. His works were used in legal higher education, in addition to the officially accepted textbooks by Martini, as handbooks written mostly in Latin or German. A three-volume book by Virozsil published in 1833 is considered as the first original work in the Hungarian philosophy of law. [33] However, his main work is Epistome juris naturae, seu universae doctrinae juris philosophicae [34] the Hungarian translation of which was published in 1861. [35] Virozsil’s oeuvre is characterized by a special contradiction. Though his theory followed Kantian doctrines, including the idea of freedom, his conclusions adopted a number of statements according to absolutist power and the existing status quo. He attempted, after the example of the French revolution, to describe all the threats that can occur in the establishment and maintenance of civil order as a result of misinterpreted natural law ideas. This attitude appeared in complete accordance with the Habsburgs’ striving for power in the 1830s.

In spite of the fact that Virozsil’s philosophy of law had a restraining influence, the Habsburg monarchy, after the Hungarian revolution and war of independence of 1848-49 was suppressed, decided on further restrictions on legal education. In the new curriculum launched in 1855, political powers wanted this discipline, aiming to communicate potentially dangerous views to be relegated to the background. Instead of legal philosophy, the history of law was emphasized, particularly the teaching of the history of Austrian and German empires and laws. However, in 1860 university autonomy and the freedom of education that had been abolished in 1848 was restored. Legal philosophical education was then renewed and German ceased to be the language of instruction.

A prominent philosopher of neo-absolutism during the two decades after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867 was Tivadar Pauler (1816–1886), who is considered as the last significant philosopher of the Kantian doctrine. Pauler became renowned as a professor of academies of law in Zagreb and Győr, and later as a professor of legal philosophy and criminal law at the University of Budapest. Through his works written in Hungarian and published beginning in the early 1840s, he became the doyen of Hungarian theoretical legal thought by the mid-19th century. Among his main works the first to be mentioned is Az észjogtudomány fejlődése s jelen állapotja (The development of the discipline of natural law and its present status), which was published in seven pieces in Tudománytár, the most important scientific journal, between 1842 and 1843. [36] In this work Pauler, similarly to Csatskó, determines the discipline of philosophy of law as a major part of „practical philosophy”, which has a profound effect on the legal life of European societies, with particular reference to public and private law as well as to the regulation of criminal law. In this early work Pauler introduced the history of theoretical legal thinking starting from Greek philosophy to contemporary trends in Hungarian and European legal philosophy. This historical overview was later repeated in his book entitled Bevezetés az észjogtanba (Introduction to natural law) [37] in 1852 as well as in its further extended publications. In the preface to his study he unambiguously explains his theoretical view, which is based on Kantian philosophy. According to his statement about legal order originating from reason independent of any positive legislation, there exist eternal and intangible truths which are assigned as standards in social conditions through the order of reason. [38]

Pauler evolves his views on Kantian philosophy in his work entitled Észjogi alaptan (Natural law doctrine) [39] in 1854, following his introduction to natural law, then in 1864 his monograph Észjogi előtan (Natural law studies) [40] was published, which was a combined version of the two previous works. [41] In the preface to his work he pronounces that „there exist standard and unchangeable legal ideas, comprehensible by reason, which create the cornerstones for all societies.” [42] Although Pauler followed the Kantian system when determining the concept of law, its main idea and the related issues, he was not a follower without any criticism. Besides describing his counter arguments, he included into his own concept the theses considered acceptable by him. In this way, positive evaluations of the ideas of Ahrens, Stahl, Haller and even Hegel occur in his writings.

From the beginnings of the 19th century the attempts of Hungarian legal philosophical thinking can be detected in Pauler’s oeuvre, which involves a move towards legal positivism gaining more and more importance in Western Europe. Another special feature of his legal concept is that he tries to combine Kantian doctrines with the views of the historical school of law, which emphasizes historical and national traditions. A good example for this is his work Büntető jogtan (Criminal law doctrine) [43] published in two volumes in the mid-1860s, which is considered by most experts to be Pauler’s main work, raising the Hungarian criminal law discipline to the academic standards of Western Europe.

Having introduced theories and authors closely connected to Kantian philosophy, we now turn to the Hungarian translations of German and French Hegelian legal philosophical works influencing legal philosophy in Hungary, which were used as handbooks in education between the 1850s and 1880s. [44] These are the works by Heinrich Karl Gross, Heinrich Ahrens and J. A. Schilling, legal philosophers of Erlangen and Leipzig, which had been translated into Hungarian. The book by Gross was translated by Ágost Greguss (1825–1882), [45] Ahrens was translated by Ferenc Magyar (1809–1882) [46] and later by Imre Bihari (1829–1882), [47] and Schilling’s monograph was translated by Rudolf Werner (1838–1907) [48] Works created by András Vandrák (1807–1884) [49] and Ferenc Thót (1817–?) [50] exclusively for teaching purposes must be emphasized, as summaries of works by Ahrens. The original books earlier had had a great influence on German, French and Italian legal philosophical thinking, and exerted a similar influence in Hungary as well. Hegelian views were gaining followers, namely the legal philosophical outlines by János Warga (1804–1875), [51] and the Kantian philosophical essays written by Gábor Szeremlei (1807–1867), [52] Nándor Kacziány (1822–1908), [53] and László Wekerle (1840–?). [54]

The last original natural law theory, which had been overshadowed by the early 19th century, had a major role in legal education as well as in scientific works in Hungary, even at the end of the century. Aladár Schnierer (1836–1898) [55] is considered a delayed representative of Kantian doctrine. Another fact to be mentioned is that in 1881, when Ágost Pulszky had lectures in legal philosophy in the approach of legal positivism at the faculty of law in Budapest, a renowned publisher decided to issue a textbook written by an author under the pseudonym „Thomasius” in the spirit of Pauler, for use by students preparing for examinations. [56] The last representative of Kantian legal philosophy was János Csarada (1850–1923), who lectured in legal philosophy at the faculty of law of Budapest from the end of the 19th century to 1920, in turn with Gyula Pikler, the main figure of the Hungarian sociological legal positivism. This fact is proved by a textbook of university lectures. [57] The Kantian views introduced by Csarada may have been a highly contrastive phenomenon parallel to the concepts of Pikler. Even in his book published in a number of issues entitled Az észjog compendiuma (The compendium of natural law) for those preparing for examinations as advocates or judges as well as for practicing lawyers, Csarada explained theoretical knowledge from an earlier standpoint of Kantian philosophy. [58]

To summarize, it may be stated that the above mentioned authors and works in the Kantian spirit have not created a reputable scientific achievement. Nevertheless, as opposed to the natural law doctrine of Wolff-Martini, these philosophers had a modernizing influence in the first third of the 19th century on Hungarian legal thinking, including statutory law disciplines not closely related to legal philosophy.

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